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Abstract The extent to which attending to one stimulus
while ignoring another inﬂuences the integration of visual
and inertial (vestibular, somatosensory, proprioceptive)
stimuli is currently unknown. It is also unclear how cue
integration is affected by an awareness of cue conﬂicts. We
investigated these questions using a turn-reproduction par-
adigm, where participants were seated on a motion platform
equippedwithaprojectionscreenandwereaskedtoactively
return a combined visual and inertial whole-body rotation
around an earth-vertical axis. By introducing cue conﬂicts
during the active return and asking the participants whether
theyhadnoticedacueconﬂict,wemeasuredtheinﬂuenceof
each cue on the response. We found that the task instruction
hadasigniﬁcanteffectoncueweightingintheresponse,with
ahigherweightassignedtotheattendedmodality,onlywhen
participants noticed the cue conﬂict. This suggests that par-
ticipants used task-induced attention to reduce the inﬂuence
of stimuli that conﬂict with the task instructions.
Keywords Self-motion perception   Perception
of angular displacement   Multisensory integration  
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Introduction
Humans perceive passive self-motion based on information
provided by multiple senses; the most important being the
visual sense and senses of inertial motion (the vestibular
system and somatosensation/proprioception). To estimate
movements of their own body in space, humans can com-
bine information from these different senses through the
process of multimodal integration. This enables them to
generate a more accurate and reliable internal representa-
tion of the movements, which can then be used for optimal
behavior (Ernst and Bu ¨lthoff 2004).
A possible role of attention in multisensory integration
It is currently a controversial issue whether multimodal
integration is an automatic process that happens early in the
sensory processing hierarchy in the brain and thus, cannot
be voluntarily manipulated (i.e., is impenetrable to cogni-
tion) (Driver 1996; Bertelson et al. 2000; Helbig and Ernst
2008). Alternatively, it may be possible that top-down
effects involving higher cognitive processes can inﬂu-
ence multimodal integration (Welch and Warren 1980;
Bertelson and Radeau 1981; Andersen et al. 2004; Mozolic
et al. 2008), although, the conditions under which
top-down control can exert an inﬂuence on the process of
multimodal integration remain unspeciﬁed.
Mathematically, the optimal unbiased estimate of a
value that is measured independently by two or more
senses is obtained if the single sensory estimates are
combined by using a weighted arithmetic mean, with
individual weights determined by their respective reliabil-
ities (Maximum Likelihood Estimate, MLE; Ernst and
Bu ¨lthoff 2004). Assuming such a model of multisensory
integration, we call these weights ‘‘cue weights’’, with the
information provided by each sensory modality being
called a ‘‘cue’’. If the brain combines cues by using MLE,
multimodal integration of stimuli should be immune to
cognitive inﬂuences like task-speciﬁed attention. However,
it is often assumed that there can be additional beliefs
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estimate, for example, if they are incorporated into the
integration process as ‘‘priors’’ in a Bayesian framework
(Yuille and Bu ¨lthoff 1996).
Unconditional multisensory integration may in some
cases not be the best way to deal with information from
multiple sensory modalities. Sensory signals should only
be integrated if they belong to the same source in the
world. This is the so-called ‘‘assignment problem’’ (Pouget
et al. 2004) or ‘‘correspondence problem’’ (Ernst 2007)o f
multisensory integration. In order to generate best esti-
mates of sensed variables, the brain has to decide ﬁrst
whether to integrate two sensory cues. To do so, it has to
determine whether the two signals have the same source,
which might involve higher cognitive functions—for
example in the superior colliculus of cats and monkeys,
neurons with multisensory response properties emerge only
after development of afferent projections from association
cortex (Wallace 2004). Including this decision of unity in
the integration process makes the estimation more robust
under sensory conﬂict (‘‘robust statistical estimation’’,
Landy et al. 1995). The belief of whether two cues belong
together can also be modeled as a Bayesian prior (Ernst
2006;K o ¨rding et al. 2007). Since the awareness of a
conﬂict between two cues could have an effect on the belief
of whether the two cues belong together, this might also
inﬂuence the proposed prior. Also, the instruction to use
one cue for the response and to ignore the other could in
principle inﬂuence the integration.
A problem similar to the assignment or correspondence
problem is described in vision, called the ‘‘binding prob-
lem’’. Our visual environment usually contains many
objects, and each of these has multiple visual features.
Therefore, perceptual grouping, or ‘‘binding’’, of these
features into objects has to be solved in visual object per-
ception. It has been proposed that attention could be the
mechanism through which a decision is reached as to
whether the features belong together. The ‘‘feature-inte-
gration theory of attention’’ (Treisman and Gelade 1980)
assumes that focused attention and/or other top-down
processing is necessary to identify objects. Within this
framework it is hypothesized that the brain would exclu-
sively attend to all the features of one object at a time, so
that all activations in the distributed visual system of the
brain would then belong to the same attended object, which
makes binding of these features trivial.
There is some experimental evidence that voluntary
attention can indeed inﬂuence the grouping of visual fea-
tures in perception. Good examples are bistable percepts,
like the face-vase illusion, the Necker cube or binocular
rivalry; the perception of which can, to a certain extent, be
inﬂuenced by volition (Meng and Tong 2004; Paffen et al.
2006). Top-down attention can also inﬂuence the
interpretation of visual slope if monocular and binocular
cues are set in conﬂict (van Ee et al. 2002, 2003).
Although the binding problem has been mostly addres-
sed in the visual system, it must also be solved within other
modalities and even between different modalities. There-
fore, binding is not restricted to visual feature binding, but
can also be extended to the case of crossmodal binding, as
has recently been addressed by Vatakis and Spence (2007)
and Senkowski et al. (2008). Possibly the rules of per-
ceptual grouping also apply for multimodal stimuli (Harrar
and Harris 2007), suggesting that voluntary attention could
also play a role in solving the assignment/correspondence
problem in multisensory integration. It has been known for
some time that if discrepancies between cues occur, their
integration is inﬂuenced by cognitive factors such as
awareness of the discrepancy, assumption of unity of the
stimuli, ‘‘compellingness’’ of the stimulus situation, and
type of response (see the review of Welch and Warren
1980). For example, humans who are required to point
towards an auditory probe (that is accompanied by a spa-
tially incongruent visual probe) are more likely to be
inﬂuenced by the irrelevant visual probe if they have rea-
son to assume that the two probes share the same location
(Bertelson and Radeau 1981).
Also some crossmodal illusions are affected by task-
deﬁned attention. Andersen et al. (2004) showed that the
crossmodal auditory-visual effects in the Shams illusion
(Shams et al. 2000) depend strongly on the task and that
auditory and visual events are not mandatorily fused into a
‘‘uniﬁed percept’’. Also the McGurk effect (McGurk and
MacDonald 1976) is affected by attention (Alsius et al.
2005, 2007), again challenging strong pre-attentive
accounts of audiovisual integration. There are also several
ERP studies which show that there is an effect of attention
on the integration of auditory and visual signals (Li et al.
2007; Talsma and Woldorff 2005).
In particular, like in visual feature binding, attending to
two information sources at the same time could promote
their integration, whereas focusing attention to one of them
and ignoring the other could inhibit the integration of the
two cues (Talsma et al. 2007; Mozolic et al. 2008). Top-
down attention would therefore be a means by which
cognitive assumptions about whether two stimuli have the
same source could be used to make multisensory integra-
tion more robust in situations where sensory conﬂicts
occur. The same mechanism could inﬂuence stimulus
processing to solve a given task. The task would deﬁne
which sensory sources to use for a response and which to
ignore, and top-down attention would impose these task-
deﬁned constraints on the sensory processing to optimize
the estimation of behaviorally relevant signals.
The term ‘‘attention’’ is used for a large variety of dif-
ferent information selection processes in the brain
288 Exp Brain Res (2009) 198:287–300
123(Corbetta and Shulman 2002). First, there can be different
sources inducing attention, which can be either the pre-
sented stimuli (‘‘bottom-up’’, ‘‘stimulus-driven’’ attention
or ‘‘saliency’’), or internal, possibly cognitive processes
(‘‘goal-directed’’ or ‘‘top-down’’ attention), which might be
under voluntary control. Also, attention can select infor-
mation with respect to different stimulus parameters, like
spatial location (‘‘spatial attention’’), the type of informa-
tion (feature-based or object-based attention; for example a
speciﬁc color, shape, etc.) or a sensory modality.
In this study we are interested speciﬁcally in top-down
attention to a sensory modality.
Experimental questions and hypotheses
In this study we investigated whether there is a mandatory,
complete integration of signals from the visual and the
inertial (vestibular/somatosensory/proprioceptive) senses
for self-motion perception, or whether participants can,
when instructed to, use information from one modality for
their response while ignoring information from the other
modality. We thus investigated the effect of voluntary top-
down attention to a sensory modality, induced by task
instructions, on multimodal integration of the attended
modality with an unattended one. Additionally, we tested
whether the inﬂuence of any task-induced attention on the
response differs as a function of whether the participant
notices a cue conﬂict or not.
Since we manipulated the focus of attention by using a
task deﬁned by the instruction to attend to one modality
and ignore the other while responding, we could not dis-
tinguish whether the effects we ﬁnd are implicitly induced
by the task or imposed by the instructions. This is reﬂected
in the term ‘‘task-induced attention’’ used throughout this
paper, meaning that the effects we ﬁnd depend on the
instruction to attend to one or the other modality.
We investigated these questions by means of a turn
reproduction task, where passively presented rotations of a
participant about the earth-vertical axis had to be actively
rotated back to the origin by the participant. During the
return rotation, we introduced ‘‘gain factors’’ between
visual and platform rotations. Speciﬁcally, the visual scene
was rotated slower or faster than the platform, with a
constant factor per trial. Thus, different turns had to be
performed to turn back the platform or the visual scene to
its original orientation. Participants were instructed to use
one of the two cues to complete the return while ignoring
the other cue. If participants put a high weight on the visual
cue, it would be expected that they would return the visual
scene more or less correctly to the original orientation
while under- or overturning the platform. The opposite
would be true if they put a high weight on the inertial cue.
From their return angle we can then deduce how much
weight they put on each of the cues to perform their return.
There are several possible ways in which multisensory
integration and attention could relate to each other in the
brain. One possibility is that visual and inertial sensory
information for the estimation of a turn angle are auto-
matically integrated into a unitary combined percept of the
rotation, and that this integration is immune to task-
instructed voluntary attention to one of the modalities. If
participants only have access to this combined percept and
not to estimates of the visual rotation and the inertial
rotation separately, then the cue weights in the responses
should not be affected by the instructions. If, on the other
hand, we ﬁnd that instructing participants to use one of the
modalities for their response and to ignore the other
modality has an effect on the cue weights in the responses,
this would argue against an exclusive automatic integration
of visual and inertial cues in the perception of these
rotations.
If participants respond only according to the instructed
modality, the results would suggest that participants have
access to independent rotation estimates from individual
modalities and are able to select one of them for their
response, according to task instructions. If, however, the
task instruction has a signiﬁcant, but incomplete effect on
the cue weights, this would indicate that the responses are
based on combined information from both modalities and
that task-induced attention to one modality inﬂuences the
relative cue weighting. Such a response pattern would
suggest that multisensory integration processes are occur-
ring, and that they are inﬂuenced by the task to attend to
one or the other modality while returning.
For optimal robust integration, it is necessary that the
information from different sensory modalities is only
integrated if the information provided by the different
modalities belongs to the same entity (is not conﬂicting).
Therefore, we also investigated whether cue weights and
the inﬂuence of task-induced attention to a particular
modality differ as a function of cue conﬂicts. In order to
determine in which trials participants were aware of the cue
conﬂict they were asked after each trial to rate whether
they had detected a conﬂict. Based on these ratings, the
trials were then divided into ‘‘cue conﬂict’’ and ‘‘no cue
conﬂict’’ conditions. If we ﬁnd an effect of task-induced
attention only in the ‘‘cue conﬂict’’ condition, this would
be evidence for ‘‘robust’’ multisensory integration, in
which task-induced attention can be used to resolve the
conﬂict (to prefer the to-be-attended-modality over the to-
be-ignored one).
Integration of cues from two modalities should lead to
an increase of the reliability of the sensory estimate, and in
turn to a reduction of the variance of the responses in
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(Ernst and Bu ¨lthoff 2004). To test this, we ran all partici-
pants also in single-cue conditions with only visual
information and only inertial information. In the ‘‘visual-
only’’ condition the platform was off during presentation
and return, so participants had to solve the task using only
visual information. In the ‘‘body-only’’ condition, rotations
were presented in darkness and had to be returned in
darkness.
Methods
Twenty volunteers (10 females), aged 20–33 years (mean
24), participated in this experiment. They were paid for
participation. None of them had a known history of neu-
rological or vestibular disorders. All participants gave their
informed consent prior to the experiment according to the
declaration of Helsinki. They were asked to read an
instruction sheet and were additionally instructed verbally
and by sample trials before the experiment to make sure
that they had understood the task.
Participants were seated on a Stewart motion platform
equipped with a ﬂat projection screen (Fig. 1). In each trial,
they ﬁrst experienced a passive rotation around an earth-
vertical axis (‘‘yaw’’ rotation, change of heading). They
then had to return actively back to the origin, using a
joystick. We measured their return angle in four different
conditions: visual-only rotations (rotation of the visual
scene but stationary platform during passive and during
active rotations, ‘‘visual-only’’, VO), platform-only rota-
tions (passive and active whole-body rotations in darkness
by movement of the Stewart platform, ‘‘body-only’’, BO),
and combined visual and platform rotations, in which
during passive and active rotations both the visual scene
and the platform rotated at the same time (‘‘combined-cue
conditions’’).
For the return in the combined-cue conditions, partici-
pants were instructed to either use the visual cue and to
ignore the inertial cue (‘‘visual attention’’ condition, VA),
or to use the inertial cue and to ignore the visual cue
(‘‘body attention’’ condition, BA). These tasks were
introduced to focus voluntary attention to either visual or to
body cues during self-motion perception. Participants were
told that during the passive presentation of the rotation,
both visual and platform rotations would always be con-
cordant, but that there might be cue discrepancies during
their active return. Thus we instructed them to attend to
only one cue in particular during their active return,
whereas they could choose to attend to one cue or both
during the passive presentation. During the VA condition,
participants were instructed to reproduce the rotation of the
visual scene by turning within the visual scene back to the
visual origin. During this condition the platform was also
rotated; however, participants were told to ignore the
platform movement. During the BA condition, participants
were instructed to reproduce the body rotation by turning
the platform back to its origin. In this case, even though
visual rotations were also presented, participants were told
to ignore them. Note that the only difference between the
VA and BA conditions was the task, which inﬂuenced
which modality had to be attended and which ignored
during the active return. The presented stimuli were the
same in both conditions.
Figure 2 shows the rotation trajectories during an
example trial in more detail. Each trial started with a
‘‘Presentation phase’’, during which participants were
passively rotated for either 10 ,1 5   or 25  in 3 s, with a
raised cosine proﬁle. These passive turns were always 3 s
long, independent of the turned angle, as a way of pre-
venting subjects from estimating the size of a rotation by
using its duration. Thus, larger rotations also involved
higher velocities and accelerations. In the ‘‘combined-
cues’’ conditions, these passively presented visual and
platform turns were always consistent (i.e. they had the
same angle, velocity proﬁle, etc.).
After the presentation phase, a short delay of 1 s was
inserted before the participant was allowed to turn back.
During the delay the auditory instruction to ‘‘turn back the
visual scene’’ or ‘‘turn back the platform’’ was played back
in the headphones to remind the participant of the current
task condition. We kept the delay short to prevent decay of
the memory of the presented rotation.
Fig. 1 Rendering of the Stewart motion platform with projection
screen, showing the random anaglyph triangle scene used in this
experiment. During the experiment, the top part of the platform was
completely enclosed by a black curtain so that subjects could not see
the surrounding laboratory
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platform and/or visual rotation, and they rotated back to the
original orientation they experienced at the start of the trial
(Fig. 2, ‘‘Active return phase’’). In the single-cue condi-
tions the mean and variance of their active return angle for
the different presented rotation angles were measured.
During the active return in the combined-cue conditions,
one of ﬁve gain factors was introduced between visual and
platform rotation (0.35, 0.707, 1.0, 1.41, or 2.85). This
meant that the visual scene was rotated at either faster or
slower rate than the platform, with a constant factor, thus
resulting in a visual rotation angle that was larger or
smaller than the platform rotation angle (Fig. 2, ‘‘Active
return phase’’). For all gain factors =1 we could compute
the relative weighting of visual and inertial cues that par-
ticipants used to compare the passive and active rotations
in the trial. Given a passively presented rotation angle t,a n
actively performed platform rotation p and an actively
performed visual rotation v (see Fig. 2), we computed the
visual weight wv to be wv = (t - p)/(v - p).
The visual weight describes how much the participant
relied on visual information for the return. For gain factors
=1, participants cannot return the platform and the visual
scene correctly at the same time. For example, if the gain
factor during the return is 2.85, the visual scene rotates
2.85 times as fast as the platform. Therefore, to turn the
platform back correctly, participants would have to turn the
visual scene more than twice as far as during the presen-
tation phase. If they would turn the visual scene correctly,
they would have to turn the platform only about 35% as far
as during the presentation phase. Consequently, partici-
pants must ﬁnd a compromise. Either they turn the
platform correctly, or the visual scene correctly, or they do
something in between. The visual weight wv describes the
inﬂuence of the visual rotation on the response. A visual
weight of wv = 1 indicates that participants matched the
visual return rotation perfectly to the presented rotation and
ignored the platform rotation completely during the return.
Conversely, a visual weight of wv = 0 indicates that par-
ticipants matched the platform return rotation to the
presented rotation and ignored the visual rotation during
the return.
Participants were explicitly instructed before the
combined-cue conditions that the rotation angles of
visual and platform rotations during active returns could
be different and that they should pay attention to one
modality and ignore the other. They were told that when,
for example, their task was to attend to the platform
rotation, the concurrent visual rotation during their active
turn will be, in most cases, different and should be
ignored (but without closing the eyes). After rotating
back in the combined-cue conditions they had to indicate
with a button press whether they had experienced the
visual rotation as being faster, the platform rotation as
being faster or that they had not noticed a cue conﬂict
while turning back. Participants did not receive any
feedback about the accuracy of their return angle, nor
about the correctness of their button presses.
VO, BO, VA, and BA conditions were presented in
separate blocks. The VO and BO conditions were always
measured ﬁrst because they were easier to handle for the
participant. (In conditions VO and BO, participants only
had to turn back to the origin by using the joystick. They
did not have to ignore one of the two modalities while
returning, and they also did not have to report cue conﬂicts.
This made the overall task easier.) Apart from that, the
order of conditions was counterbalanced across partici-
pants. Each of the combinations of 5 gain factors and 3
target turning angles was measured 8 times, resulting in
120 trials for each block (480 trials per participant).
The order of trials in each block was randomized, but
within the dynamic constraints deﬁned for each trial by the
current position of the platform within its yaw rotation
range (-55 …55 ). As subjects turned the platform
actively, it was impossible to predict the end position of the
platform after a trial. To minimize the number of platform
repositionings needed during the experiment, the next trial
to be presented was selected online depending on the
current position of the platform. The trial selection algo-
rithm also balanced the conditions presented during the
experiment as much as possible, so that not all small
rotations would be presented at the beginning of the
experimental block. Only during circumstances under
which none of the remaining trials could be presented was
the platform repositioned.
Participants saw a visual scene on a projection screen
located in front of them (86  horizontal 9 63  vertical,
viewing distance 0.65 m). A 3D visual scene was shown by
using red-cyan viewers. It consisted of a ﬁeld of random,
limited-lifetime triangles in anaglyphic 3D. We used
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Fig. 2 Schematic representation of the rotation trajectories in one
combined-cue trial. The visual weight wv can be computed from the
response as wv = (t - p)/(v - p)
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123random triangles instead of random dots to facilitate stereo
fusion. Approximately 150 triangles were visible at the
same time, at distances between the screen distance and up
to 2–3 m. Triangle brightness was attenuated with distance
to enhance the impression of depth. Triangle lifetime was
1.2 s. We chose this rather long interval to reduce motion
in the image, so that participants could accept the scene as
stable and not moving by itself. The limited lifetime was
necessary so that participants could not solve the task of
turning back visually by remembering a static pattern of
triangles, but had to rely on visual motion cues. A ﬁxation
cross at eye height was located approximately 10 cm in
front of the screen. Participants were told to ﬁxate on the
ﬁxation cross during all turns.
We used a 3D visual stimulus to increase the visual
immersion for the participants. It has been shown that the
impression of self-motion (vection) is more compelling
when stereoscopic cues are used (Palmisano 2002) and if
the moving scene is farther away from the observer than an
attended object (Nakamura and Shimojo 1999; Kitazaki
and Sato 2003). In our case both the frame of the screen
and the ﬁxation cross were stationary with respect to the
observer and closer to the observer than the moving 3D
scene. The rotation did not introduce any motion parallax
in the image, as the camera was turned around the optic
center of the camera projection.
Participants used a joystick that was mounted in front
of them to control active rotations. Deﬂecting the joy-
stick sideways controlled angular rotation velocity such
that, the more it was pushed sideways, the faster the
platform and scene rotated. When the joystick was cen-
tered the rotation stopped and when released, the joystick
re-centered automatically. The translation of joystick
deﬂection to rotation speed was randomized for each
trial by using a translation factor between 1 and 2 to
prevent motor learning effects. This meant that for
higher translation factors a small joystick tilt caused a
fast rotation, whereas for lower translation factors the
joystick had to be tilted much more for the same effect.
Participants could use corrections if they thought that
they had turned too far.
Participants wore noise-cancellation headphones play-
ing noise (a mixture of recorded sounds of the platform
itself and a river) to mask noises of the motion platform.
Shakers agitating the seat and foot plate were used so that
the participant could not sense vibrations of the motion
platform legs.
Results
All statistical tests were made using repeated-measures
analyses of variance (ANOVA). Post hoc comparisons
using Neuman–Keuls tests (P\0.05) were performed
when necessary.
Performance in the single-cue conditions
The mean return errors for every participant and condition
in the single-cue conditions BO (body-only or platform-
only; whole-body rotations in darkness) and VO (visual-
only; rotations of the visual scene while the platform was
off) are shown in Fig. 3. They were analyzed using a 3 9 2
[target angle (10 ,1 5  ,2 5  ) 9 cueing condition (BO, VO)]
ANOVA. The ANOVA revealed a main effect of target
angle [F(2,38) = 88.5, P\0.001], the return errors being
signiﬁcantly different between the three target angle levels
(see Fig. 3). On the other hand, there was no signiﬁcant
effect of the cueing condition. There was a signiﬁcant
interaction between cueing condition and target angle
[F(2,38) = 9.53, P\0.001].
These results show that participants could solve the task
using either of the modalities alone, and were more accu-
rate in the VO than the BO condition.
Effect of attending to a modality in the combined-cue
conditions
In the combined-cue conditions VA (‘‘visual attention’’)
and BA (‘‘body attention’’), the participant could use both
visual and inertial sensory information to estimate the size
of the rotations. We were interested in the relative weight
that the visual rotation and the inertial rotation had on the
return angle for different target rotation magnitudes. To
compute cue weights and the tendency to over- or under-
estimate rotations during the active return, we ﬁtted linear
functions to the measured rotation angles over gain factors,
individually for different participants, target angles, and
attention tasks (VA, BA). Two parameters were ﬁtted: a
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Fig. 3 Responses in the single-cue conditions, shown as response
offset (or ‘‘response error’’; returned angle minus presented rotation
angle). Values above zero indicate that participants turned back too
far, whereas values below zero indicate that participants stopped short
when turning back. Error bars represent standard deviations (whis-
kers) and standard errors (bars) across all 20 participants
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123weighting factor between the visual and the inertial target
rotation expressed as visual weight wv (the inertial weight
being 1 - wv), and a constant offset c. The offset c is
equivalent to the ‘‘response offset’’ found in the single-cue
conditions, as shown in Fig. 3. Any tendency to over- or
under-rotate for a given target rotation angle independent
of the gain factor will show up in c.
For a given presented target angle a, gain factors gi,
visual target rotation angle tv(a, gi) = a   gi, body target
rotation angle tb(a, gi) = a and response angle r, the visual
weight wv and the offset c were derived by minimizing the
error e,
e¼
X
i
ððwv tvða;giÞþð1 wvÞ tbða;giÞþcÞ rða;giÞÞ
2:
We then computed two separate 3 9 2 [target angle
(10 ,1 5  ,2 5  ) 9 attention condition (VA, BA)] ANOVAs,
for response offsets and visual weights, respectively.
Figure 4 shows the resulting data of all participants. The
response offset was signiﬁcantly affected by the target
angle [F(2,38) = 96.1, P\0.001], participants returning
small rotations quite accurately but larger rotations not far
enough (Fig. 4, left). There was also a main effect of the
attention condition. The participants returned farther when
the platform was attended than when the visual scene was
attended [F(1,19) = 5.2, P\0.05]. The interaction
between target angle and attention condition was not sig-
niﬁcant for response offsets [F(2,38) = 2.1, P[0.05].
The cue weights also depended on the target angle and
on the attention task. The visual weight was signiﬁcantly
higher for small rotations than for large rotations
[F(2,38) = 40.3, P\0.001], the visual weights differing
signiﬁcantly between all pairs of target angles. We also
found a main effect of attention. The visual weight was
higher if vision was to be attended, and lower if the inertial
rotation was to be attended. That said, the ignored modality
still had a strong inﬂuence on the responses. The difference
was signiﬁcant [F(1,19) = 19.4, P\0.001]. Attending to
the visual rotation thus increased the visual weight in the
response, and attending to the physical rotation decreased
it: The mean visual weight over all participants was
between 0.76 (for 10  rotations) and 0.61 (for 25  rota-
tions) in the VA condition, and between 0.53 and 0.41 in
the BA condition. The interaction between target angle and
attention condition was also not signiﬁcant for cue weights
[F(2,38) = 0.3, P[0.05].
Even though attending to one modality gave that
modality a higher weight in the response, participants could
not ignore the other modality completely in either case.
The cross-modal inﬂuence of vision in the BA condition
(visual weights 0.53–0.41) is higher than the cross-modal
inﬂuence of the inertial rotation in the VA condition
(inertial weights 0.24–0.39). We compared these weights
by using a separate 3 9 2 (target angle, attention condi-
tion) ANOVA and found that the difference is signiﬁcant
[F(1,19) = 7.48, P\0.05].
Do participants respond differently when they notice
cue-conﬂicts than when they do not?
After each active return, participants indicated whether
they thought the visual rotation had been faster, the plat-
form rotation had been faster, or whether they had not
detected a difference between the visual rotation and the
platform rotation. Figure 5 shows that participants were, in
general, not very accurate at this task, and that they
responded similarly in VA and BA conditions. The dis-
crimination performance is, however, in agreement with a
study by Jaekl et al. (2005), in which participants detected
visual-vestibular conﬂicts during rotations only for gains
below approximately 0.8 and above approximately 1.4.
These responses enabled us to split the data into trials in
which participants reported that they did not notice a cue
conﬂict while returning and trials in which they reported
that they did notice a conﬂict and investigate the effect of
the instruction to attend to one of the modalities on the
responses independently in the two cases.
Splitting the data reduced the number of data points per
condition, and poses the problem that we no longer have
complete data sets for all participants and conditions.
Typically, participants responded more often ‘‘conﬂict
detected’’ during trials with gain factors far from 1, and
more often ‘‘no conﬂict detected’’ during trials with gain
factors close to 1 (see Fig. 5). Some participants have such
a strong bias to respond ‘‘conﬂict detected’’ or ‘‘no conﬂict
detected’’, that there are very few or no data points in some
conditions. For those participants with enough data points
for all ﬁts, we ﬁt linear functions with cue weights and
offset to the data as described in the previous section,
independently for ‘‘no conﬂict noticed’’ and ‘‘conﬂict
noticed’’ trials. For this analysis we required that all
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Fig. 4 Offsets and visual weights for different conditions and target
angles. Black attend to physical rotation (BA), gray attend to visual
rotation (VA). Error bars and whiskers show standard error and
standard deviation over participants
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123function ﬁts should be based on at least ten data points. 13
of the 20 participants (7 female and 6 male) reached this
criterion.
Results for the visual weights as a function of conﬂict
detection are shown in Fig. 6. Offsets are shown in Fig. 7
and indicate that they did not differ signiﬁcantly as a
function of conﬂict detection and are not analyzed further.
We analyzed the visual weights using a 3 9 2 9 2
ANOVA with target angle (10 ,1 5  ,2 5  ), attention con-
dition (VA, BA), and conﬂict awareness (no conﬂict
noticed, conﬂict noticed) as within-subject factors. The
interaction of conﬂict awareness and target angle, and the
triple interaction of conﬂict awareness, target angle, and
attention condition were not signiﬁcant. However, there
was a signiﬁcant interaction between the attention condi-
tion and conﬂict awareness [F(1,12) = 7.01, P\0.05].
Post hoc analysis showed that visual weights in the BA
condition were signiﬁcantly lower if conﬂicts were noticed
compared to both VA conditions. Analysis of the data for
‘‘conﬂict noticed’’ and ‘‘conﬂict not noticed’’ in separate
ANOVAs showed that the effect of the attention condition
on the responses was signiﬁcant when cue conﬂicts were
noticed [F(1,12) = 20.70, P = 0.001], but not when they
were not noticed [F(1,12) = 2.9, P[0.05]. This shows
that the inﬂuence of attention on the cue weights was
stronger when cue conﬂicts were noticed than when they
were not noticed.
Response variability in the different experimental
conditions
If visual and inertial cues are integrated, this should result
in a reduction of the variance in the participants’ responses,
compared to the single-cue conditions VO and BO. Since
each condition was tested eight times per subject, we can
compute response variances for all participants and con-
ditions. From the single-cue response variances rv
2 and rb
2
we can make a prediction for the variance of the responses
in the combined-cue conditions under the assumption that
the cues are integrated optimally (i.e., they follow a max-
imum-likelihood estimate; MLE):
r2
v;b ¼
r2
v   r2
b
r2
v þ r2
b
We can then compare this prediction with the response
variances in the combined-cue conditions.
To compute the response variances, we ﬁrst normalized
the responses by dividing them by the target angle. In con-
ditions VO and VA, the ‘‘target angle’’ was the passively
presentedvisualrotationangle.IntheBOandBAconditions
it was the passively presented platform rotation angle. Then,
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Fig. 5 Histograms of perceiving cue conﬂicts for different attention
conditions and gain factors (visual rotation divided by platform
rotation), over all 20 participants. A gain factor of one means that the
visual rotation and platform rotation were equivalent. White visual
rotation was perceived as faster, black no conﬂict between visual and
platform rotation was noticed, gray platform rotation was perceived
as faster
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Fig. 6 Visual weights as a function of the detection of conﬂicts,
target angle and attention condition, for 13 participants. Gray attend
to visual rotation, black attend to inertial rotation. Error bars and
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123for each participant, target angle, and gain factor individu-
ally, we computed a response variance over the eight
repetitions in that condition. We then took the arithmetic
mean of these variances over the ﬁve gain factors. This
resulted in 60 variance measures for the 20 participants 9 3
target angles. From these distributions we can calculate the
mean,standarddeviation,andstandarderror.Figure 8shows
theresultsforthedifferentexperimentalblocksandtheMLE
predictionof the variance in the combined-cue conditions as
black error bars with whiskers.
For the gray and white plots in the combined-cue condi-
tions, the same procedure was followed, but the initial
variances were calculated only from those trials which fell
into thecategory ‘‘conﬂict detected’’(white) or‘‘conﬂictnot
detected’’ (gray). The variance for participant, target angle,
and gain factor was only included if two or more data points
fell into that category (one cannot compute a variance from
justone,orno,datapoint).ThedistributionsforVO,BO,and
MLEarecomputedfrom60varianceseach,andeachofthese
variancesiscomputedover40trialrepetitions.Theblackbar
plotsaboveVAandBAconsistof300varianceseach,which
are each computed over eight trial repetitions. The distri-
butionsinthe‘‘conﬂictdetected’’and‘‘conﬂictnotdetected’’
conditions(grayandwhitebarplots)arecomputedfrom200
to 283 variance measures, and each variance is computed
from 4.0 to 5.4 trial repetitions on average.
The data shows a reduction of the variance in the
combined-cue conditions compared to both single-cue
conditions only in the VA condition, and only if the
analysis is restricted to those trials in which participants did
not notice a cue conﬂict (gray bar above ‘‘VA’’ in Fig. 8).
Two-sample t tests show that the distribution of variances
is signiﬁcantly lower than the response variances in VO
(P\0.05) and BO (P\0.001) conditions, and is not
statistically distinguishable from the MLE prediction
(P[0.05). The overall variance distribution in VA (black
bar above ‘‘VA’’) and the variance distribution restricted to
‘‘conﬂict noticed’’ trials (white bar above ‘‘VA’’) are not
signiﬁcantly different from the distribution in VO, nor are
they different from the MLE prediction.
Discussion
In this experiment we investigated the effect of task-
induced attention to a particular modality on the integration
of visual and inertial cues during actively reproduced turns.
These effects were compared for conditions in which cue
conﬂicts were perceived and when they were not perceived.
We found that asking participants to use one of the two
modalities while ignoring the other signiﬁcantly affected
relative cue weighting. However, the inﬂuence of the
ignored cue could not be completely suppressed. The cross-
modal bias of vision on inertial cues was stronger than the
bias of inertial cues on the visual rotation.
We also found that the amount of inﬂuence that the task
had on the relative cue weights in the responses correlated
with an awareness of the cue conﬂict. In trials in which no
cue conﬂict was noticed, the effect of the task on the
responses was not signiﬁcant. If, however, conﬂicts were
noticed, attending to one modality increased its weight in
the combined estimate. In the following, we discuss the
different experimental ﬁndings in more detail.
Over- and under-rotations in the turn reproduction task
We found that participants did not reproduce a large enough
angle during large rotation trials (25 ) in all four conditions
BO,VO,BA,andVA.Under-rotationsforactivelyreturning
a passively presented whole-body rotation have also been
observed in a previous study by Israe ¨l et al. (1996), though
for much larger rotation angles (180 ). Such an under-rota-
tion is somewhat surprising if both the passively presented
and actively reproduced turns are misestimated similarly.
Speciﬁcally,anyunder-oroverestimationsoftheturnangles
should cancel out in the turn reproduction task. The differ-
ence we ﬁnd must thus come from a difference in
misestimatingthetworotationsinatrial.Theeffectcouldbe
explained by a stronger underestimation of passive rather
than active turns. Alternatively, it could be explained by a
stronger underestimation of the ﬁrst compared to the second
turn; for example, if the memory of the ﬁrst rotation decays
overtime.Athirdpossibilityisthatsinceactivereturnswere
under the control of the participants, their motion proﬁles
differed from a raised cosine, which could inﬂuence the
perceived size of the rotation.
Ju ¨rgens and Becker (2006) proposed a model for human
rotation perception, based on experimental evidence, in
which a ‘‘default velocity’’ represents a top-down prior
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Fig. 8 Normalized response variances in single-cue conditions VO
and BO, the MLE-prediction of the combined-cue variances from the
single-cue variances, and measured variances in the combined-cue
conditions VA and BA, overall (black), when no cue conﬂicts are
noticed (gray) and when cue conﬂicts are noticed (white). Error bars
and whiskers represent standard error and standard deviation,
respectively
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123which is integrated with bottom-up sensory cues in a
Bayesian framework. This default velocity could be
adapted to the average velocity during an experiment, and
draw responses towards an average value. Ju ¨rgens and
Becker found that this ‘‘tendency towards the mean’’ is
reduced when more sensory cues are available, which is
consistent with the idea that the tendency towards the mean
is caused by a top-down Bayesian prior.
A similar prior could be the reason for the underesti-
mation in our experiment, which would represent a very
small or even zero rotation (0 ). The Bayesian framework
predicts that the less reliable the sensory estimate, the
stronger the effect of this prior would be. Since the ﬁrst
turn has to be kept in memory, a decrease in reliability of
the memorized ﬁrst turn would increase the inﬂuence of a
zero-rotation-prior on that turn, reducing its effective size,
so that participants would turn less in their active response.
A different reason is suggested by the results of a study
by Lappe et al. (2007). They showed that whether traveled
distances are under- or overestimated depends on the task
given to the participant. The difference is explained by a
leaky integration during the movement, of either the dis-
tance to the starting point or the remaining distance to a
target. If participants had to travel to a previously indicated
target, they did not travel far enough (they thought they had
traveled farther than they actually did); when they had to
indicate the starting position after moving, they set the
target too close (they thought that they moved less than
they actually did).
In our experiment, both cases applied. Speciﬁcally,
during the passively presented rotation, participants had to
keep track of the starting position and during the active
return, they had to update the distance to the target.
According to Lappe et al. (2007), participants would ﬁrst
assume that they traveled less than they actually did in the
passive rotation and traveled farther than they actually did
in the active return. Consequently, both effects would add
up and cause an under-rotation in the response, which is
consistent with our ﬁndings.
Effect of turn size on cue weights
We found a signiﬁcant effect of the target angle on the cue
weights, with a higher visual weight for small rotations
(10  target angle) and a lower visual weight for large
rotations (25  target angle), while the opposite was true for
inertial cue weights.
In this experiment, all passively presented rotations
were 3 s long, independent of the rotation angle. This
means that larger rotations also had higher accelerations
and velocities than smaller rotations. Therefore, we could
not determine whether the differences in cue weighting
depended on rotation angle, velocity, or acceleration.
If the MLE framework is correct, cue weights should
follow the respective reliabilities of the individual cues.
Therefore, in our experiment it would be predicted that
visual rotations would be relatively more reliable for small
angles and inertial rotations would be more reliable for
larger rotations. The smallest of our rotations (3.3 /s
average) were quite close to vestibular thresholds com-
pared to the largest rotations (8.3 /s average). The
threshold for such cosine yaw rotations of about 3 s
duration is around 1.5 /s in darkness and 0.55 /s in the
presence of a visual target (Benson et al. 1989; Benson and
Brown 1989), but the variability across participants is high.
The threshold for visual motion is lower, in the range of
0.3 /s (Mergner et al. 1995).
Also, for larger visual rotations, the visual target region
went off the projection screen, which may have reduced the
reliability of the estimate of the size of the visual turn. It is
therefore reasonable to assume that the reliability of the
inertial cue increases with respect to the reliability of the
visual cue as the turn size increases.
Effects of attending to a modality and noticing cue
conﬂicts
Participants responded differently when they were
instructed to use visual cues than when they were
instructed to use inertial cues for their response. This
suggests that the cues are not always mandatorily fused
into a singular ‘‘combined percept’’ of the rotation.
Instead, our results indicate that for their response, par-
ticipants put more weight on the modality which was to
be attended according to the task instructions. Further
analyses showed that the effect of task-deﬁned attention
on the response is signiﬁcant only in trials in which
participants responded that they noticed a difference
between the visual and the inertial rotation, but is not
signiﬁcant if they reported that they did not notice a
difference. This suggests that participants could use task-
deﬁned attention to reduce the inﬂuence of a to-be-
ignored cue on the response, particularly when they notice
that it is conﬂicting with the to-be-attended cue. In our
results, even when participants noticed cue conﬂicts, the
ignored modality still had an effect on the response. Thus,
participants did not have access to pure sensory signals
from the individual modalities during cue conﬂict condi-
tions and could not simply use one cue for the response
while completely ignoring the other cue. This is consis-
tent with ﬁndings from a study by Bertelson and Radeau
(1981) on visual-auditory cue integration, where it was
found that a crossmodal inﬂuence on stimulus localization
can still occur even when cue conﬂicts are noticed.
In another experiment investigating the inﬂuence of a
concurrent visual stimulus on auditory localization,
296 Exp Brain Res (2009) 198:287–300
123Wallace et al. (2004) asked participants after each trial
whether they had perceived the signals in the two modal-
ities as coming from the same or from different sources.
Comparable to the results in our study, they found that the
reported auditory stimulus location was strongly drawn
towards the location of the visual stimulus only when
participants reported that they had perceived visual and
auditory stimuli as a uniﬁed event, but not when they were
perceived as separate events. Also, the response variability
was lower when visual and auditory events were perceived
as uniﬁed. This is consistent with our results, as we also
found lower response variances when participants did not
perceive a conﬂict between visual and inertial cues. We
found an indication of true integration, as evidenced by a
reduction of the response variance in comparison to the
single-cue conditions, only in the VA condition when the
visual cue was to be attended, and only if no cue conﬂicts
were reported. In that condition, the variance of the
responses was not statistically distinguishable from what
would be expected if visual and inertial cues were opti-
mally integrated in a maximum-likelihood fashion.
Lambrey and Berthoz (2003) also investigated the effect
of awareness of conﬂicts between visual and body yaw
rotations on cue weights, but in a different way. They did
not instruct the participants to use one of the modalities and
ignore the other, and they also did not tell them about the
cue conﬂicts. During the experiment the participants were
interrogated repeatedly to ﬁnd out at what point during the
experiment they became aware of the conﬂict. The exper-
imenters then compared the weights of the cues before and
after the participants became aware of the conﬂict. They
found that about half of their participants had a bias
towards using visual cues, and the other half inertial cues.
After the participants became aware of the conﬂict, the bias
towards the preferred cue was increased. Our results agree
with those ﬁndings, and additionally show that task-
induced attention can select the preferred cue. Our results
also show that the strength of the attentional bias can
change on a trial-by-trial basis as a function of the current
awareness of a conﬂict when participants are not naı ¨ve
about the possible occurrence of cue conﬂicts.
Helbig and Ernst (2008) performed a visual-haptic cue
integration experiment to investigate the effect of atten-
tion on modalities on multimodal integration. They
manipulated the amount of available resources for the
processing of signals in visual and haptic modalities dif-
ferentially by introducing a secondary task. They did not
ﬁnd an effect of the secondary task on cue weights,
showing that visual-haptic cue integration was immune to
their manipulation of attentional resources. Since they
kept cue conﬂicts so small that they were not noticed by
the participants, these results are also consistent with the
present study.
Some caveats
There are a few caveats when interpreting the results of this
study. Firstly, since participants always rotated back
actively, we could not control the duration and movement
proﬁle of the second turn in each trial. Many participants,
but not all, tried to imitate the raised-cosine rotation proﬁle
of the passive rotations. The variability in the motion
proﬁle of their active turns might add to the response
variability we ﬁnd within and across participants. Also, the
rather short delay between the passive rotation and the
active return might cause a contamination of our results by
rotation aftereffects. Such aftereffects can, however, not
explain any response differences as a function of task
instruction or conﬂict awareness. A study by Siegler et al.
(2000), where much larger and longer rotations were
shown to the participants, did not ﬁnd any difference in the
response accuracy whether or not a yaw turn was repro-
duced immediately after presentation or after the end of
post-rotatory sensations.
We found a correlation between ‘‘becoming aware of a
cue conﬂict’’ and the ‘‘strength of the task-deﬁned atten-
tional bias’’ towards one of the modalities. However, we
could not determine from this study whether this is a causal
relationship and if so, what the causal direction is. Further
experiments will be needed to evaluate whether noticing a
cue conﬂict enforces top-down attentional inﬂuences, or
whether participants become aware of cue conﬂicts more
often when they are more attentive.
Neural basis of self-motion perception
The neural basis of the multimodal perception of self-
motion in humans is still obscure. Most imaging methods
do not allow movement of the participant’s head, and
imaging methods that would be feasible during self-
motion, e.g., EEG and near-infrared spectroscopy (NIRS),
have a rather low spatial resolution. Some studies have
investigated brain activity in response to large-ﬁeld optic
ﬂow stimuli (Brandt et al. 1998; Beer et al. 2002;
Kleinschmidt et al. 2002; Deutschla ¨nder et al. 2004; Wall
and Smith 2008) and interactions of visual and vestibular
self-motion signals by using caloric stimulation
(Deutschla ¨nder et al. 2002). Since the stimuli used are not
true self-motion stimuli, it remains unclear whether the
same results would be obtained with actual self-motion.
Some of the observed effects might be attributable to dis-
crepancies of vestibular and visual stimulation.
Animal studies have shown that vestibular and visual
signals already interact at the level of the vestibular nuclei
(Henn et al. 1974) and that several separate but intercon-
nected regions in the cortex process vestibular information.
Most importantly these include, the posterior insular region
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123termed the ‘‘posterior insular vestibular cortex’’ (PIVC) as
well as regions in parietal, somatosensory, cingulate, and
premotor cortices (Guldin and Gru ¨sser 1998)
Studies on cortical processing of self-motion stimuli
using single-cell recordings in animals have focused on
only a few regions; in particular areas MSTd (Froehler and
Duffy 2002; Gu et al. 2007; Takahashi et al. 2007; Morgan
et al. 2008; Britten 2008) and the ventral intra-parietal
sulcus VIP (Bremmer et al. 2002a, b; Britten 2008). It has
been suggested that cortical area MSTd, which contains
cells that are sensitive to large ﬁelds of visual motion and
also to vestibular stimulation, could be a central cortical
area for integration of visual and vestibular signals of self-
motion. A subpopulation of the neurons in MSTd shows
responses to visual and vestibular translations which are
consistent with a Bayesian cue integration model (Gu et al.
2007; Morgan et al. 2008). For rotations, however, such
cells were not found (Takahashi et al. 2007). Virtually all
cells in MSTd which are sensitive to both visual and ves-
tibular rotations prefer opposite rotation directions for the
two modalities. This suggests that instead of integrating
visual and vestibular stimuli, cells in MSTd actually
remove head rotations from the visual motion signal so that
the resulting responses represent movement of objects in
space while discounting self-rotation. Therefore, MSTd is
most likely not the brain region in which visual and ves-
tibular signals of self-rotations are integrated.
For yaw rotations, like those investigated in this
experiment, it has been shown in rats that there is a special
system of interconnected subcortical and cortical regions
which maintains and updates a heading signal of the animal
based on visual, vestibular, and somatosensory cues; the
so-called ‘‘head-direction cell system’’ (Taube et al. 1990a,
b; Taube and Bassett 2003; Zugaro et al. 2000). Although
mostly studied in rats, such cells have also been found in
primates (Robertson et al. 1999), which suggests that they
might also be present in humans and might play a larger
role in the cortical processing of yaw self-rotations than
currently recognized.
Conclusions
We ﬁnd that the transition from integration to a task-
deﬁned bias towards one of the cues coincides with
becoming aware of the conﬂict between the cues. Also, we
found a reduction in the response variability compared to
single-cue conditions (which is an indicator of actual cue
integration), only when the visual stimulus was attended to
and no cue conﬂicts were noticed. This suggests that par-
ticipants do not integrate visual and inertial cues in all
situations, but that they can choose one cue for the
response when they notice cue conﬂicts. Further,
participants can, to some extent, ignore the conﬂicting cue,
but not completely. We could not ﬁnd signiﬁcant evidence
for an effect of task-deﬁned attention on cue weights when
no cue conﬂicts were noticed.
Taken together, our results corroborate ﬁndings from
studies on the integration of other sensory modalities
(Warren et al. 1981; Bertelson and Radeau 1981; Wallace
et al. 2004) and suggest that the integration of visual and
inertial cues during earth-vertical rotations breaks down if
participants notice cue conﬂicts.
These results are consistent with a ‘‘robust integration’’
model of multisensory integration, in which task-deﬁned
top-down inﬂuences, like the instruction to attend to one
stimulus and ignore the other, can be used by participants
to resolve conﬂicting sensory stimuli in accordance with
the current task.
As has been proposed by previous studies (Warren et al.
1981; Talsma et al. 2007; Mozolic et al. 2008), the task to
attend to one cue and ignore the other could reduce the
integration of cues from different modalities, whereas
attending to both cues at the same time could promote their
integration. In our study, we found that the integration
broke down particularly when participants noticed conﬂicts
between the cues, and only then did the task instructions
have a signiﬁcant effect. Thus, in cases when participants
assume that both cues give compatible information about
the measured value, it might be more difﬁcult for them to
follow the task instructions and ignore one of the cues than
when they become aware that the information in the cues is
conﬂicting.
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